Prototype. There's nothing to download yet, no mutuals exist, and no lawyer has read the trust deed or the licence. We're publishing early so it can be tried and argued with.

The Kanecta trust deed

A first draft, in plain English. Draft 0.1.

This is not a legal document. It's what we want the deed to do, written plainly so a New Zealand trust lawyer can turn it into a real one. Points that need a lawyer's view are marked For counsel. Clauses we haven't decided on yet are marked Candidate.

Contents

  1. Background and purpose
  2. Definitions
  3. Part A — The sealed core
  4. Part B — What the trust does
  5. Part C — Trustees
  6. Part D — Extending the rules
  7. Part E — Dissolution
  8. Part F — Reconstitution
  9. Part G — Substance over form
  10. Schedule 1 — Operating rules

Background and purpose

The settlor has written a piece of software called Kanecta and wants to give it to the world on terms that keep it owned by the people who use it. This deed creates a trust to hold Kanecta for that purpose.

The purpose of the trust is to hold Kanecta, its name and its licence so that Kanecta stays available to everyone on the terms of its licence, cannot be enclosed or sold into private hands, and is governed by its members rather than by any one person or organisation.

The trust is designed to have as little discretion as possible. Wherever it might need to make a decision, this deed gives it a rule that applies automatically instead. A trust with nothing to decide is a trust with nothing worth capturing.

This is intended as a private (non-charitable) purpose trust. It is deliberately not charitable: it exists for the benefit of its members rather than the public, and is expected to pay tax. Is a private purpose trust workable here, given New Zealand law's historical reluctance about purpose trusts without human beneficiaries? If not, what is the closest structure that keeps the asset lock and the absence of beneficial interest?

Definitions

Kanecta
The software of that name, its source code, documentation, and the types, components, functions and templates published with it, as settled on the trust and as contributed to it afterwards.
The Assets
The copyright in Kanecta, the Kanecta trade marks, the domain names, the contribution agreements, and any other property the trust holds.
The Licence
The Open Ownership Software Licence, as published by the trust.
Mutual
An organisation that meets the published criteria in Schedule 1 and has registered with the trust. (The name "mutual" is a placeholder.)
Member
A natural person who is a member of a Mutual and whose annual declaration is current. Members who have declared hardship, or who contribute in kind, are Members in exactly the same way.
Contributor
A Member who has had a contribution accepted into Kanecta, or has been employed by a Mutual to work on Kanecta, in the previous twelve months.
Objective condition
A fact that can be checked by counting, reading or the passage of time, without anyone exercising judgement.

Part A — The sealed core

Part A can never be changed by anyone, by any means: not by the trustees, not by the Members, not by the settlor. This deed gives no one a power to amend Part A, and nothing done under any other part of this deed can alter it.

A1The Assets stay put Settled

The Assets may never leave the trust's control. The trust may not sell, transfer, assign, give away, exclusively license, mortgage, charge or otherwise encumber any of the Assets, to anyone, on any terms, by any mechanism — whether for profit, at cost, for a nominal sum or for nothing.

This does not stop the trust granting the Licence, or any other non-exclusive licence that is consistent with this deed.

The intent is that the asset can never pass into private hands by any route. "Not sold for profit" was rejected as wording because it misses transfer at nominal value, exclusive licensing (selling control without selling the asset), and encumbrance. Are there routes we've still missed — for example, a related-party licence on unusual terms, or a court-ordered sale to satisfy a debt? How should the trust be protected against creditors?

A2No private benefit Settled

No person may receive any profit or private benefit from the trust or the Assets. This includes the settlor, every trustee, and anyone connected to them.

Paying a fair, market-rate wage or fee for real work actually done, and reimbursing actual expenses, is not a private benefit. Anything else is.

A1 and A2 are deliberately separate: an asset can be locked inside a trust and still leak money to the people around it. Please test A2 against the usual leakage routes (inflated fees, related-party contracts, loans, perks).

A3The source is always available Candidate

The complete source code of Kanecta, as held by the trust, must always be available to anyone who receives Kanecta, on the terms of the Licence.

Not yet decided whether this belongs in the sealed core or in Schedule 1.

A4The right to fork can never be removed Candidate

The Licence must always allow anyone to take a copy of Kanecta and develop it separately. The trust may never publish a version of the Licence that removes or narrows that right.

Not yet decided whether this belongs in the sealed core or in Schedule 1.

A5Only natural persons vote Candidate

Only natural persons may be Members or vote on anything under this deed. Organisations may support a Mutual or belong to it, but they never vote.

Not yet decided whether this belongs in the deed or in the Licence.

A6Supremacy Settled

Nothing added under Part D, nothing in Schedule 1, and nothing done by the trustees or the Members may alter, weaken or work around anything in Part A. If anything conflicts with Part A, Part A wins and the conflicting thing has no effect.

This is the wall that lets the deed be extended without being amendable. Is a sealed core, plus a bounded power to extend the schedules, plus this supremacy clause, sound under the Trusts Act 2019? Can the extension power be drafted so it can never be used as a back door into Part A?

Part B — What the trust does

Everything in Part B is ministerial. The trust carries out these functions by following rules. It does not exercise judgement about who deserves what.

B1Hold the Assets

The trust holds the copyright, trade marks and domain names, and keeps registrations and renewals current.

B2Hold and publish the Licence

The trust publishes the Licence and the current price, and makes both freely available.

B3Hold the contribution agreements

The trust holds the agreements under which people and Mutuals assign their contributions to it. Every Mutual must assign to the trust all contributions it makes or accepts from others.

B4Register Mutuals

Any organisation that publishes the facts required by Schedule 1 and notifies the trust is registered. Registration is notification, not permission. The trust confirms the facts by reading what the organisation has published. It may not refuse, delay, or add conditions. Registered Mutuals appear on a public list.

If a Mutual's published facts stop meeting Schedule 1, it comes off the list automatically when the cure period in Schedule 1 runs out.

B5Host the code

The trust hosts a public copy of Kanecta and mirrors of each Mutual's main copy. It may record a pointer to the copy the Mutuals currently treat as the main one, but it never decides which copy that is. The trust has no editorial control over Kanecta.

B6Store the price

The trust receives the price-vote tallies submitted by Mutuals, adds them up by the rules in Schedule 1, publishes every tally and the result, and records the result as the price in the Licence. It does not choose the price, and it does not choose when or whether to vote.

B7Registration fees

The trust may charge Mutuals a registration fee set by Schedule 1, to cover its own running costs. The trust never receives Members' dues.

B8Enforce the copyright

The trust has standing to enforce the copyright and the Licence, and does so by instructing outside lawyers. It does not keep an in-house enforcement function.

Enforcement is the one function where some discretion seems unavoidable (whether to sue, whether to settle). Can it be bounded by rules — for example, a duty to act on any breach confirmed by a published process, with settlement terms limited to compliance plus costs?

B9The stored-default rule

Wherever this deed would otherwise need the trust to decide something about the Mutuals or the Members, a stored default applies instead, triggered by an objective condition. For example:

  • If no valid price result is recorded for 24 months, the last recorded price continues.
  • If no trustees can be drawn under Part C, the interim trustees' terms continue until they can.
  • If a vote has nil turnout, the current position continues.

Where this deed is silent, the trust does nothing, and the current position continues.

Part C — Trustees

C1Interim trustees

The first trustees are named in the signing schedule. There must be at least three, and a majority must be independent of the settlor. The settlor may be one of them but never holds any power the other trustees don't.

C2Moving to selection by lot

Once the trust has registered at least [N] Mutuals with at least [N] Members between them, each vacancy is filled by random draw from the pool in C3, and interim trustees step down one at a time as their terms end.

The trigger numbers are placeholders. They need to be objective and reachable.

C3The pool

Trustees are drawn from Members who have opted in to the pool:

  • two-thirds of seats from Contributors, and
  • one-third from Members who have been in good standing for at least [two] years.

The draw, the pool and the result are published, and the draw uses a method anyone can check.

C4Terms and duties

Trustees serve fixed, staggered terms of [three] years and can't serve consecutive terms. Because the trustees' role is ministerial, being competent at following the rules is all that's required. The trust holds liability insurance for its trustees.

Trustees carry real duties and liability. Is an opt-in random draw compatible with those duties? What induction, insurance and indemnity is needed?

C5Appointment and removal

The power to appoint and remove trustees is not held by any person. Trustees are appointed only by the draw in C2. A trustee is removed only on an objective condition: their term ends, they stop being a Member, they're disqualified by law, or they fail to attend [three] consecutive meetings.

Whoever holds the power to appoint and remove trustees really controls a trust. The aim is that nobody holds it — especially not the settlor. Can it be removed from people entirely like this? If a fallback holder is legally required, who should it be?

Part D — Extending the rules

D1Who may extend

The Members may add to or change Schedule 1 by a vote triggered under the petition rule in Schedule 1 (S3) and passed by [two-thirds] of votes cast, with Contributors' votes weighted two-thirds and other Members' one-third.

D2What may be extended

Only Schedule 1. Nothing else in this deed can be changed by anyone.

D3What may never be touched

Part A, by A6. Any change that would weaken Part A has no effect.

Part E — Dissolution

E1The software is released

If the trust ends for any reason, every condition the Licence places on using Kanecta ends with it, and Kanecta becomes available to everyone under a permissive licence. The copyright is not transferred to anyone.

This is deliberate. Nobody is chosen to receive Kanecta, so there's nobody to choose wrongly, and no reason to bring the trust down in order to take it.

E2Everything else

Any remaining tangible property — money, equipment, domain and trade mark registrations — goes to one or more organisations that further open-source software or the digital commons, chosen by the final trustees. No such organisation may be connected with any trustee or the settlor.

E1 and E2 are two different mechanisms in one clause: the licence obligations evaporate, while tangible residue goes to a category of recipient (never a named charity — it may not exist in fifty years). Can copyright be "released" like this on dissolution — for example by an irrevocable permissive licence granted now and conditional on dissolution, or by assigning the copyright on a public-domain-style trust? Does directing the residue to a category satisfy the law?

Part F — Reconstitution

The most dangerous clause in the deed, because it's the one lever that replaces the trust. Drafted last, and with the most care.

F1When it can be used

Only if the trust has been legally unable to perform its functions in Part B for [twelve] consecutive months. That is a fact that can be checked, not a feeling that the trust has gone wrong.

F2How

The Members may, by a vote of at least [80%] of votes cast with turnout of at least [N]%, establish a new trust in another place on the same terms as this deed, including Part A unchanged, and the Assets move to it.

Reconstitution exists for one case dissolution doesn't cover: a healthy trust being captured, for example by force. Because it keeps the obligations alive under new management, a bad actor would want to manufacture its trigger. The trigger must make capture-by-process harder than capture-by-invasion. Is "legally unable to perform its functions" objective enough? Is moving the Assets compatible with A1?

Part G — Substance over form

G1Look through

In applying this deed and the Licence, the trust looks at the substance of an arrangement, not its form. If a company, shell or chain of entities is used to avoid an obligation, the trust may treat the real beneficial party as the one responsible, and may challenge in court any Mutual that is in substance a vehicle for a for-profit organisation.

This never applies to a natural person's own declaration of hardship, which is never questioned.

Modelled on tax general anti-avoidance rules. "May treat" is discretion — can this be framed as a rule applied by a court on application rather than a call made by the trust?

Schedule 1 — Operating rules

The rules in this schedule may be extended under Part D. Nothing here may weaken Part A.

Does a detailed voting procedure belong in a schedule to the deed, or in a separate ruleset the deed refers to?

S1What makes a Mutual

An organisation qualifies if its own published rules say that:

  • it is non-profit and distributes no profit to anyone (following the profit rules in the Incorporated Societies Act 2022, whatever its legal form);
  • it is controlled democratically by its members, one person one vote;
  • the majority of its governing body are its workers;
  • nobody may ever be refused membership;
  • members can be expelled only for their conduct towards the organisation itself, never for who they are or what they do elsewhere;
  • it assigns all Kanecta contributions it makes or accepts to the trust;
  • it charges the price recorded in the Licence, and accepts hardship declarations without question;
  • it publishes its price-vote tallies.

A Mutual may be in any country, and anyone in any country may join it.

If a Mutual's published rules stop meeting these criteria, it has [90] days to fix them before it comes off the list.

S2The price vote

  • When: every year, as part of each Member's annual declaration. Nobody calls it.
  • The question: one line — "The current price is X. What do you think it should be?"
  • Counting: each Mutual counts its own Members' answers and submits a tally in the published format.
  • Weighting: Contributors' answers carry two-thirds of the weight, other Members' one-third.
  • Result: the weighted median of all answers. Candidate
  • Publication: every Mutual's tally and the result are published, so anomalies are visible and can be challenged.
  • Default: if no valid result is recorded, the current price continues (B9).
Blocking. A single mandatory price that every Mutual must charge, set by the trust as licensor, may engage resale price maintenance law. The mutuals never agree a price among themselves; the price is a term of the licence, voted directly by Members. Is mandatory uniform pricing lawful on this basis in New Zealand, and in each country where Mutuals operate? Nothing goes live until this is answered.

S3Petitions for new questions

A vote on anything other than the price happens only when at least [N]% of Members, or [N] Members, sign a petition for it. The petition sets the question. The trust administers the vote but never chooses whether to hold one or what it asks.

S4The annual declaration

Each Member confirms once a year, on a pre-filled form that takes about five minutes:

  • which Mutual they belong to;
  • that they've paid their dues, or that they're declaring hardship;
  • the price they think Kanecta should be.

The declaration stays short. Adding a question to it requires the Part D process, and it may never carry more than [three] questions.


Draft 0.1, prepared from our design notes. It has not been reviewed by a lawyer. See also the trust in plain words and the licence.